#2: "Equal" Protection

Ryan and Luke dive in to Part One of a two-part series covering the Fourteenth Amendment. In this episode, the team explores the Equal Protection Clause—hopefully with new and improved sound quality (thank god).


U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee Cty., Kan., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (emphasizing that separate but equal is still not equal under the Equal Protection Clause).

See generally U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (suggesting, albeit implicitly, that a subordination approach may be permissible for semi-suspect classes, using sex as the example).

See generally Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S.Ct. 2198 (2016) (exploring the boundaries of affirmative action under the Equal Protection Clause).

See generally San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (examining whether classification based on socio-economic status should be subjected to strict scrutiny).

See generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (emphasizing that the basis for a Colorado law could only be explained by animus toward the gay community).

See generally Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (determining that statutory or administrative sex classifications are subject to intermediate scrutiny).

See generally Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (holding that racial quotas violate the Fourteenth Amendment, but race as an admissions criterion may be permissible).